Title: Lightning Talks
Speaker: .*
Country of origin: .*
A slot will be reserved for lightning talks. Just get up on stage and talk about whatever you want. Worst that can happen we throw pierogi at you.
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Title: Infecting files on-the-fly (OTF)
Speaker: Pastitas
Country of origin: 🇪🇸 Fariñaland
Infecting files during a MITM attack is a common way of malware infection vector. Exists several tools to do it, free tools, commercial tools even leaked tools. Several drawbacks exists with this tools like Not real on the fly infection, only PE files infection.
I will present some techniques to avoid that drawbacks. The talk will not only be PE centric, I will talk about OTF infection of other file types. The topics covered are state of art, reverse engineer file types, ways to infect and protocol abusing. I will also use a Open Source tool I developed for these tasks.
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Title: The Return of Software Vulnerabilities in the Brazilian Voting Machine
Speaker: TheSpider
Country of origin: 🇧🇷 Huehueland
This presentation shows a detailed and up-to-date security analysis of the voting software used in Brazilian elections. It is based on results obtained by the authors in a recent hacking challenge organized by the Superior Electoral Court (SEC), the national electoral authority. During the event, multiple serious vulnerabilities were detected in the voting software, which when combined compromised the main security properties of the equipment, namely ballot secrecy and software integrity. The insecure storage of cryptographic keys, hard-coded directly in source code and shared among all 500,000 machines, allowed full content inspection of the software installation memory cards, after which two shared libraries missing authentication signatures were detected. Injecting code in those libraries opened the possibility of executing arbitrary code in the equipment, violating the integrity of the running software. We trace the history of the vulnerabilities to a previous security analysis, providing some perspective about how the system evolved in the past 5 years.
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Title: Attacking Kubernetes
Speaker: "The Donald" @ White House
Country of origin: 🇺🇸 Mordor
This talks' focus lays on a popular containerization tool called Kubernetes. Common implementations of Kubernetes are not secure by default and a lot of information about hardening is not known to the public. Since version 1.7 the security level has increased and common security misconfigurations have been mitigated. During this talk it will be demonstrated what happens if these mitigations are not applied and how to abuse them. The talk will be about both securing and attacking the platform and could be considered a 'purple team' talk. Multiple live demos are planned, most of them ending in a guest-to-host escape and a root shell.
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Title: I'm gonna get your crypto exchange down
Speaker:
Doctore
Country of origin: 🇵🇱 PiSland
Crypto takes over the world. So many coins (mostly shitcoins but who cares?), so many exchanges and wallets online. As someone said “You can either rob a conventional bank or a crypto currency company. Both have millions, but unlike traditional banks, cryptocurrency companies are startups with only 20 people.” Hundreds of billions of dollars are lying on the street to pick them up. And you on the other side who wants to rule them all!
This talk will show you how to start with easy pentest of cloud crypto wallet dedicated for particular coin and end up with shutting down the crypto exchange with the GDPR in the background. No demo because it’s down :(
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Title: Catch me if you can. I’m behind 7 proxies.
Speaker: kukabeludo
Country of origin: 🇧🇷 Huehueland
Privacy is a dream far away to be a reality in our life. But how to reduce the impacts of surveillance? The adversaries’ ability to compromise TOR RELAYS is mining our trust in anonymous networks such as TOR but this war is not totally lost. How to defeat the TOR compromised relays?
The ability of read all your text messages including but not limited to emails, SMS messages, Telegram, Whatsapp, Signal conversations and let’s not forget about all your phone calls, gives the adversary total control over your communication channels. What about the alternatives?
Giving a special attention to the problems related with the TOR network. This presentation will analyze some de-anonymization techniques which allowed surveillance agencies to identify TOR users. I will propose an approach to invalidate those techniques. The idea is to reduce and difficult powerful attacks such data correlation attacks, even considering that your adversary has a full compromised TOR RELAYs and your sensitive data is prone to pass by those compromised relays.
As a bonus I will present a tool which solves the principal TOR NETWORK issues like:
- Stability: TOR is considered an unstable network. The packet loss is high and seems that it’s an eternal problem for such kind of anonymous network. How to solve this issue?
- Speed: The anonymity behind the TOR network is based on the capability of this network in make your connection hop a couple of times before reach the final destination. Those hops can happen in countries from different continents and this slow down the speed of TOR NETWORK. My solution allows you to watch movies in High Resolution in YOUTUBE, and use TOR network for everything without fell the pain of use a considered “slow network”.
- Compromised Relays: The number of TOR compromised relays is increasing. The adversary can intercept your data even inside the anonymous network. This tools reduces the chances of a successful data correlation.
In fact, how to transport sensitive data is only one item from your list of concerns. We will see how to reduce the chances of a successful attack against 2FA mechanism, Passwords, Encryption, and see simple solutions to solve old but huge issues like how to manager your passwords.
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Title: Secure WireGuard VPN traffic from quantum attackers
Speaker: B4dCoff13
Country of origin: 🇹🇼 Not China
VPN software is used to secure traffic exchanged inside a private network, which travels through encrypted tunnels. In general, the encryption relies on certain cryptography (e.g. RSA or ECC) which is predicted to be broken by quantum computers in 10 years. Any encrypted traffic may therefore be stored today and decrypted in the near future. Consequently, one must update the cryptography to avoid this looming danger. This talk demonstrates an approach to modifying a promising VPN software, WireGuard, to make it secure againt quantum computers.
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Title: The Hitch-hacker's guide to (gain access to) the internal network
Speaker: @adon90 &
@rockajansky
Country of origin: 🇪🇸 Fariñaland
TL;DR: We will present several procedures to obtain access to the internal network while attacking from the Internet that have been successfully carried out in real case scenarios during Red Team exercises. The attack vectors were the exploitation of divers web application vulnerabilities (one of them in a SAP, a combination of vulnerabilities that led to RCE) and also different ways to achieve RCE from an Office document, some of them Macro-less, for phishing & fun. Technical stuff inside guaranteed.
Pentesting may be a boring adventure sometimes. But other times, a little thread is found in the process and pulling it, it leads to satisfacting exploitations that end allowing you access beyond the external perimeter. In this talk several cases will be detailed, including one performed in a SAP asset by modifying an exploit for a vulnerability that was supposed to be present only in the authenticated part of the application...but it wasn't needed any login.
But as everyone knows, human factor usually is the weakest link of the chain, and that attack vector could be an easier way to reach the internal network. Two milestones during a Red Team exercise were enough motivation to research about RCE from Word documents for Phishing campaigns: access to an SMTP Server through a Path Traversal vulnerability plus obtaining a couple of valid credentials for email accounts of employees by a Brute Force attack against an OWA Exchange Server.
Also, we will discuss lightly about Windows LOLbins used for RCE during tests, combined with VBS scripts, XML, Powershell commands, etc. We are still doing some research about that and responses from AVs.
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Title: Compile-time Memory Corruption Mitigations: Current State of Affairs
Speaker: ad
Country of origin: 🇵🇱 PiSland
Memory corruption mitigations are an active area of research for more than a decade now, both compile-time and run-time. In this talk we will take a look for the current landscape of the former (compile-time) for mainstream compilers. We will dig into details and read up some assembly which will help us understand all the "Why's", "How's", and "When's".
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Title: Making the USD
Speaker: buherator
Country of origin: 🇭🇺 Not Romania
Surprise warez! If you want to know more, you'll have to be here!
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Title: Python Reversing Challenges
Speaker: Disconnect3d
Country of origin: 🇵🇱 PiSland
Some interesting Python reversing challenges to blow your mind.
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Title: "Bad signals - weaponize 2G, 3G and 4G roaming network attacks
Speaker: c0decafe
Country of origin: 🇩🇪 We didn't dare to make the obvious joke about this one
Weaknesses of SS7 Roaming Networks are well known – but what about the Diameter interfaces coming up at the moment? Diameter is and will be used for roaming connections of LTE/LTE-A mobile networks - a new architecture, and a new implementation. But still, one remains the same: it is a AAA protocol designed for trusted environments - roaming interconnection interfaces between providers.
As we know from the past, it is possible to get access to such networks, as you can simply buy access if you spend enough money; as typical attackers in such environments are fraudsters or agencies, they definitely will. Therefore, securing these interface and assessing the infrastructure components and its configuration is very important.
In our talk, we will explain not only how Diameter-based networks work and which messages and functions exit, but also which of them can be abused by attackers. Typical attacks are information leaks about the environment, but also attacks against the authentication and encryption of customers. These information can be used for interception of mobile data/calls, but also to establish new business models of fraud.
To demonstrate such attacks, we developed a testing framework covering information gathering, mobile phone tracking, denial of service attacks, pay fraud, and interception of data. The framework will be released during our talk and will enable providers and security companies to assess a telco's diameter network configuration and demonstrate what can happen if no proper security measures are applied. We also will give an outlook on how a provider can protect from such kind of attacks.